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PETER J. HENNING*
The Changing Atmospherics of Corporate Crime
Sentencing in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act Era
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002' HAS BEEN VIEWED as a watershed event in
dealing with corporate fraud. The law requires publicly-traded companies to adopt
extensive-some say onerous2-internal controls to ensure that organizations can-
not again be used to perpetrate the perceived frauds of Enron and WorldCom,
regardless of whether that perception reflects reality in any way.3 In response to
questions about who should be held responsible to prevent the next wave of corpo-
rate fraud, Congress enhanced the power of auditors to scour corporations for pos-
sible material weaknesses and required lawyers for the first time to act as
"gatekeepers" for their corporate clients No Congressional enactment can ever be
complete without the seemingly obligatory criminal law provisions that adopt new
measures to prosecute corporate miscreants and send them to jail for ever-longer
prison terms.
The new criminal laws added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did little more than add
a few arrows to the bountiful quiver of federal prosecutors-charges that can be
added on top of the usual suspects of mail fraud, wire fraud, and false SEC filings
in corporate prosecutions. Where the Act actually effected substantial change was
in the sentencing of defendants convicted of committing crimes through business
organizations, especially publicly-traded companies. In a direct way, the Act re-
quired the United States Sentencing Commission to ratchet up the potential
sentences of defendants by adding new or increased enhancements to the sentenc-
ing calculation for fraud offenses Indirectly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the
I Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. © 2008 Peter J. Henning. I appreciate the
assistance of Olive Hyman and the editors of the Journal of Business & Technology Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
2. See Joseph Schuman, A Corporate Oversight Rule Looks Set to be Eased, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006.
3. Sara B. Smith, Note, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 307-The Price of Accountability: How Will Section 307
Affect the Role of the Corporate Attorney?, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 901, 931 (2005).
4. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the Post-SOX Environ-
ment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 58, 62 (2007); Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387,
1402-03 (2004).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 903-06, 1104.
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atmosphere of criminal sentencing by signaling to federal judges that the light
sentences once meted out to white collar offenders were no longer acceptable.6
An emboldened Department of Justice began pursuing executive officers of com-
panies perceived as being enmeshed in fraud, and after the convictions, judges were
more than willing to impose substantial terms of imprisonment by following the
Sentencing Guidelines. Punishments that would make a few drug dealers blanch
became, while not quite routine, at least within the realm of possibility for chief
executive officers (CEOs) charged with leading their companies into ruin. For ex-
ample, Bernie Ebbers, former CEO of WorldCom, received a twenty-five year
prison term,7 while former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling received a bit over twenty-
four years.8 Other CEOs who received lengthy prison terms even when their com-
panies did not fail include the twelve-year terms for Sanjay Kumar from Computer
Associates9 and Walter Forbes of Cendant.' Prosecutions for leaving a company in
shambles still can be seen, such as with David Stockman," but such conduct is no
longer a prerequisite for the prosecution of a senior corporate officer. Defendants
like Gregory Reyes of Brocade Communications 2 and Conrad Black of Hollinger
International 3 were charged with crimes without regard to the health or viability of
their companies, which continue in business today.
The changed atmospherics of corporate crime sentencing is not entirely attribu-
table to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A significant change in the potential severity of
sentences for fraud went into force in November 2001 when the Sentencing Com-
mission adopted changes to the Guidelines that increased the potential sentence
based on the amount of the loss (or the defendant's gain).'" Those changes went
into effect almost at the exact time Enron started to implode,"s a process that led to
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act the following year. The Act provided a
strong impetus toward the substantial sentences we are now seeing in corporate
crime cases, making lengthy prison terms for executives (which were once unthink-
able) almost commonplace.
In this Essay, I will review briefly the additions to the federal criminal law arsenal
adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and note its more important sentencing provi-
sions that pushed judges to give longer sentences in corporate fraud cases. 6 To
6. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 112.
8. Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at Cl.
9. Ex-Software Executive Begins Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at C5.
10. Ex-Cendant Chairman Sentenced for Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at C21.
11. Collins & Aikman Sues David Stockman, Its Former Chief, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2007, at C4.
12. Indictment, United States v. Reyes, 2006 WL 4686714 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CR 06 0556 CRB).
13. First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Black, 2005 WL 4659915 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 05 CR
727).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2Bl.(b)(1), cmt. n.2(B) (2001), amended by U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2002).
15. Alex Berenson, S.E.C. Opens Investigation into Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at C4.
16. See infra Parts I, II.
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illustrate how things have changed since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, I
will apply a sentencing analysis to a hypothetical CEO based on the 2000 version of
the Sentencing Guidelines and the 2007 version, which incorporates the effects of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.1 7 This comparison demonstrates just how much the Act
impels judges to impose significant sentences, even after the Sentencing Guidelines
became advisory and no longer bound judges to follow its prescriptions rigidly.
The push for higher sentences may be abating, however, or even reversed, now that
the Supreme Court has made it clear that federal judges enjoy substantial discretion
in crafting sentences that need not adhere strictly to the Guidelines. 8 That process
may well lead to lower sentences, largely ending the push for greater punishment
embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 9
I. THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
Congress took three steps in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to enhance criminal penalties.
Specifically, Congress created new criminal offenses, increased the sentences for the
fraud provisions most commonly charged in corporate crime prosecutions, and
directed the Sentencing Commission to increase the potential penalties for a range
of fraud offenses in the Sentencing Guidelines. The criminal provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act created four new crimes and expanded the scope of one
other.20 The new offenses are:
* securities fraud;
2
'
* CEO/Chief financial officer (CFO) certification;
22
* destruction of records in an investigation or bankruptcy; 23 and
* destruction of corporate audit papers.24
Congress expanded the scope of one of the obstruction of justice provisions to
clarify that it is now a crime to alter or destroy a document to make it unavailable
in an investigation, or to otherwise impede an official proceeding.25 These provi-
sions were viewed by Congress as correcting gaps in the federal criminal firmament
to reach the next Arthur Andersen that shreds documents, and the future CEO who
perpetrates fraud by plumping up the corporate balance sheet.26
17. See infra Part Ill.
18. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005); see infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. For a thorough review of the criminal law provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Lisa H. Nicholson,
The Culture of Under-Enforcement: Buried Treasure, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Corporate Pirate, 5 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L.J. 321, 338-43 (2007).
21. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. V 2007).
22. Id. § 1350.
23. Id. § 1519.
24. Id. § 1520.
25. Id. § 1512(c).
26. Gary G. Grindler & Jason A. James, Please Step Away from the Shredder and the "Delete" Key: §§ 802
and 1102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 67, 77-83 (2004).
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Aside from the CEO/CFO financial statement certification provision, the new
laws are largely duplicative of other criminal statutes, and indeed the securities
fraud provision is narrower than the often-used antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, such as Rule 10b-5.27 There have been few criminal prosecutions
under these new provisions, and these offenses do not appear to have meaningfully
affected prosecutors or the policing of corporations. For example, the new destruc-
tion of records provision has been used a few times, but not in corporate fraud
prosecutions. Rather, the destruction of records provision has been used most
prominently in child pornography cases.2" Even the certification provision has not
been utilized by prosecutors to any great degree, although the SEC has relied on it
in civil enforcement actions.29 The only significant prosecution of a CEO for alleg-
edly certifying false financial statements was the prosecution of former Health-
South CEO Richard Scrushy, who was acquitted of the charge."0
Along with the new crimes, Congress also increased the sentences for the fraud
provisions' most common charges in corporate crime prosecutions. The maximum
sentence for mail and wire fraud jumped from five to twenty years,3 and the maxi-
mum sentence for violations of the federal securities laws, which typically involves
the antifraud provision in Rule 10b-5, went from ten to twenty years.3 2 The penalty
for a conspiracy to engage in mail fraud, wire fraud, or for the violation of the new
securities fraud provision is now equal to the punishment for the object offense
rather than the prior five-year maximum.3
Statutory maximums are largely meaningless, however, because under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines the actual recommended term of imprisonment is always far
less.34 So while it makes for a striking media report to say that a defendant faces 100
years in jail for the charges in an indictment, there is no realistic possibility that the
27. See Phillip Wesley Lambert, Comment, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the Additional
Criminal Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839, 851 (2003) ("[A]n examina-
tion of the language contained in [18 U.S.C. § 1348] reveals that it covers virtually identical transactions and
conduct as the language in the Securities Act and Exchange Act, and in some cases, is substantially less protec-
tive of investors than its counterpart provision in the Securities Act.").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding the conviction of Amanda
Wortman for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (destruction of records in an investigation) when she broke a CD
believed to contain child pornography).
29. See Daphne Eviatar, Case Closed?, LITIG. 2007: Supp. AM. LAW. & CORP. COUNSEL, Fall 2007, at 18.
30. Betty Joan Thurber, A Behavioral Science Analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley's Certification Requirements-The
Right Kind of Deterrence?, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 123, 140 (2005).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2007).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 ("Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter
shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy."). A conspiracy count allowing the government to try all the corporate
chieftains together is a common feature of these types of cases.
34. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications
of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 384 (2004) ("But in federal white-collar cases, the statutory maximum sentence for a
single count of conviction usually has no relation to the maximum sentence a judge could actually impose
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ultimate sentence-if there is a conviction-will be anywhere close to what Con-
gress authorized as the highest punishment.
The third step in the process of enhancing the criminal penalties was the direc-
tion the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave the Sentencing Commission to increase the po-
tential penalties for a range of fraud offenses in the Sentencing Guidelines. Section
905 of the Act essentially tells the Commission to "do the right thing" in adjusting
the Guidelines to increase the potential severity of sentences." Two admonitions in
particular send this message to the Commission about sentencing in corporate
fraud cases:
(1) ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements reflect the seri-
ous nature of the offenses and the penalties set forth in this Act, the growing
incidence of serious fraud offenses which are identified above, and the need to
modify the sentencing guidelines and policy statements to deter, prevent, and
punish such offenses;
(2) consider the extent to which the guidelines and policy statements ade-
quately address whether the guideline offense levels and enhancements for vio-
lations of the sections amended by this Act are sufficient to deter and punish
such offenses, and specifically, are adequate in view of the statutory increases
in penalties contained in this Act ....36
Congress could not have been much clearer in asking for increased sentences, and
as the next section shows, it got what it wanted by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:
significant-if not draconian-corporate fraud sentences.
II. CHANGES IN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE BOOKER EFFECT
After the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Sentencing Commission took up
the mandate to update the Guidelines to reflect the recommended enhanced
sentences for corporate crimes. After first adopting emergency amendments in Jan-
uary 2003 to comply with the Act's 180-day deadline,37 the Commission adopted
permanent amendments that went into effect on November 1, 2003. 3' These
changes increased sentences on both the low end of the applicable Guidelines range
and allowed for even longer sentences at the higher end of the Guidelines range.39
because a single criminal scheme so often consists of a multitude of acts separately chargeable as federal
crimes.").
35. Id. at 405-07, 409-11.
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 905(b)(1), (2), 116 Stat. 745, 805 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 994) (emphasis added).
37. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (Supp. 2003).
38. See id. app. C, vol. II.
39. See Bowman, supra note 34, at 431-32. Professor Bowman discusses the effect of Senator Joseph
Biden's insertion of a "legislative history" into the Congressional Record that suggested changes the Sentencing
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The Sentencing Commission's first step to increase prison terms for corporate
crime was to increase the base offense level for a fraud offense if the crime was
punishable by a term of imprisonment of twenty years or more.4" This played di-
rectly into the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased the sentences for
mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud to twenty years, thus effectively increas-
ing the starting point for a Guidelines sentence. While a one-level increase sounds
fairly innocuous, it can have the effect of increasing a sentence by as much as a year
or more if the loss from the offense is significant.4'
Next, the Commission added two levels to the fraud loss table, for losses greater
than $200,000,000 and $400,000,000, with a two-level increase for each higher
amount.4 2 This change would have a significant effect on the sentences handed
down in cases where a publicly-traded company collapsed due to fraud by the de-
fendants because most such organizations will have a market capitalization greater
than those amounts.
43
Another step to raise sentences in corporate fraud cases was to add an additional
enhancement based on a larger number of victims, with a six-level increase if there
were more than 250 victims of the crime on top of the two- and four-level en-
hancements for more than ten and more than fifty victims, respectively.44 If the
shareholders of a company are the victims of the fraud, then it often will be quite
easy to establish a large number harmed by the crime because most public compa-
nies have thousands of shareholders. 45 For securities law cases, an additional four-
Commission should make in the Congressional Record right before the Commission decided on the amend-
ments it would adopt in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id. Professor Bowman concludes:
Senator Biden's "legislative history" is in many respects a curious document. It was written, placed
into the Congressional Record, and delivered to the Sentencing Commission nine months after the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, but only days before the Commission was to vote on final post-
Sarbanes-Oxley amendments. It is the product of Senator Biden and his staff, not of any committee
or even any group of senators. Its obvious purpose was to tell the Sentencing Commission pointedly
and publicly what Senator Biden wanted them to do. Faced with the prospect that a Justice Depart-
ment appeal to Congress would receive support not only from Republicans but also from a promi-
nent Judiciary Committee Democrat, the Commission voted for a broad-based, albeit small and
curiously structured, sentence increase.
Id. at 432.
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(a)(1).
41. See Bowman, supra note 34, at 433 ("First, though a one-base-offense-level increase may seem insignif-
icant, it actually has profound effects on thousands of individual defendants. It bumps up the sentencing range
of every federal fraud defendant by one level, thus increasing the minimum guideline sentence of defendants
subject to imprisonment by roughly ten percent.").
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B.(b)(l) (2003).
43. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 6 (2003). The Commission also included as a new factor for determining loss in
a corporate fraud case a reduction in the value of equity securities or other corporate assets that resulted from
the offense. Id. at 6 n.4. Thus, the loss calculation was expanded to include not just direct harm to the business,
but also the more indirect harm to investors by looking to any effect on the market price of the securities.
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.l(b)(2).
45. See, e.g., MERGENT FIS, INC., HANDBOOK OF DIVIDEND ACHIEVERS (Brad A. Armbruster ed., 2000)
(revealing the number of shareholders and other institutional information for Abbott Laboratories).
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level enhancement applies if, at the time of the offense, the defendant was an officer
or director of a publicly-traded company.46 Unlike other enhancements that are
more broadly based, this enhancement is limited to prosecutions involving a con-
viction for violating the federal securities laws.47
These changes to the Sentencing Guidelines occurred before the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker 8 that changed them from being
mandatory to advisory.49 Two recent opinions applying Booker show the continuing
battle over how the Guidelines will be applied. In Rita v. United States,50 the Court
held that a within-Guidelines sentence can be accorded a presumption of reasona-
bleness by a court of appeals reviewing the district court's punishment determina-
tion, at least in what it called the "mine run of cases."'" In Gall v. United States,"2 the
Court determined that a sentence outside the prescribed Guidelines parameters is
not subject to special scrutiny so long as the district court reasonably justified the
ultimate sentence. 3 Further, appellate review of non-Guidelines sentences is lim-
ited to whether the district court abused its discretion, a particularly forgiving stan-
dard that will encourage judges to consider individual factors rather than focusing
solely on the Guidelines. 4 District court judges now have much greater flexibility in
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2BI.I(b)(14)(A).
47. Id. Enhancements already in the Guidelines were adjusted to cover the types of corporate collapses that
triggered the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For example, an existing enhancement for endangering the
safety and soundness of a financial institution, which dates back to the savings and loan crises of the early
1990s, was expanded to include offenses that substantially endanger the solvency or financial security of an
organization that, at any time during the offense, was a publicly traded company or had 1,000 or more employ-
ees. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(12)(B). Along the same lines, if the crime substantially endangered the solvency or financial
security of 100 or more victims, regardless of whether a publicly traded company or other organization was
affected by the offense, then the same four-level enhancement applies. Id. The rationale for these provisions is
that crimes require a longer sentence when they jepoardize the financial security of a significant number of
people. Of course, if the crime has such a significant effect on a company's financial position, the amount of
the loss likely will be substantial, already triggering a significant sentence under the Guidelines. Ultimately,
these enhancements likely serve to make a significant sentence even longer, perhaps reaching life imprisonment
for a financial crime in which there was no threat to public safety. See id.
48. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
49. Id. at 245.
50. 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
51. Id. at 2465. The Court stated:
An individual judge who imposes a sentence within the range recommended by the Guidelines thus
makes a decision that is fully consistent with the Commission's judgment in general . . . . [T]he
courts of appeals' "reasonableness" presumption, rather than having independent legal effect, simply
recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge's discretionary decision accords with the
Commission's view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is proba-
ble that the sentence is reasonable.
Id.
52. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
53. Id. at 591.
54. The Court set forth the following standard for all sentencing after Booker.
Accordingly, after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem ap-
propriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether
they support the sentence requested by a party. In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines
range is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he
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deciding what sentence to impose than at any time since the adoption of the Guide-
lines in 1987, but still "a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by
correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range."" Thus, the Guidelines re-
main the starting point of the sentencing process.
III. A HYPOTHETICAL SECURITIES FRAUD INVOLVING
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
To understand the effect of the various changes adopted in response to the de-
mands for increased sentences embodied in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the following
hypothetical scenario will be used to analyze how comparable conduct would be
treated under the 2000 version and current version of the Guidelines. This illus-
trates the true effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the criminal law. As will be
shown, the potential sentence in a securities fraud case could equal or exceed what
the Guidelines call for in a drug case involving a significant amount of narcotics or
child sexual abuse prosecution. After reviewing the scenario, I consider whether the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Gall may reverse, at least in part, the trend
toward greater sentences generated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The hypothetical case involves the CEO of a company, Bronco Communications
Corp. (BCC), whose stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. BCC owns
television and radio stations in smaller markets throughout the United States. The
CEO, with the board's approval, decides to sell a number of radio stations due to
weakening revenue. Revenue is decreasing because satellite radio services are draw-
ing away listeners from terrestrial radio, and marketers are advertising on the in-
ternet rather than in traditional media outlets. The CEO agrees to deals to sell
seven stations in the Pacific Northwest to one company, and eleven stations in the
Mid-Atlantic area to another company. The CEO and three senior executives, who
were responsible for the sale negotiations, ask each of the purchasing companies to
insert a clause in the contracts that apportions three million dollars from each deal
as a payment for a "non-compete" agreement, under which a private company con-
trolled by the CEO and the executives agrees not to purchase a competing radio
station in the same markets as the stations being sold. The payment will be made
directly to the private company, and the deal agreement makes reference to the
payment, but not the recipient. In a presentation to BCC's board of directors rec-
ommending the deals, the CEO generally refers to the non-compete agreements,
decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the devia-
tion and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.
We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justifica-
tion than a minor one. After settling on the appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.
Id. at 596-97.
55. Id. at 596.
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but does not explain that the money will go to a company that he and the other
executives own.
Two years after approving the transactions, an internal auditor raises questions
about who received the two non-compete payments. A review by the audit com-
mittee leads to an investigation by outside counsel, revealing the payments to the
private company. The private company's records show that the CEO received half
the total payments, and the other three executives split the remaining three million
dollars. The BCC board terminates the four executives, and federal prosecutors file
charges against the four executives for securities fraud, (based on false financial
statements fled by the company that did not reflect the true nature of the non-
compete payments), mail fraud (for defrauding BCC), and conspiracy. One defen-
dant pleads guilty and agrees to testify for a reduced sentence of two years, and the
three remaining defendants are convicted on all counts after trial.5 6
Under the 2000 Guidelines, the following would be the major components of the
sentencing calculation under section 2F.l, which applies to fraud offenses:
* Base Offense Level: 6.
* Loss Enhancement: 14 (based on a $6 million loss, or alternatively the defend-
ants' gain from the fraudulent scheme).
* More Than Minimal Planning: 2.
* Abuse of a Position of Trust: 2."
Using an Offense Level of 24, the sentencing range provided in the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table is fifty-one to sixty-three months if the defendants are in Crimi-
nal History Category I, which is usually a safe assumption in white collar crime
cases involving corporate executives." In addition, if any of the defendants testified
at trial and denied that they intended to engage in a scheme to defraud, then after
the conviction the government usually would seek a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice.5 9 If applied in this case, the resulting sentencing range would
be sixty-three to seventy-eight months.6"
Under the 2007 Guidelines, which incorporate both the 2001 changes to the
fraud loss table and the enhancements adopted in response to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, a much more severe sentence will be available under section 2BI.l:
56. The scenario is very loosely based on the prosecution of Lord Conrad Black, the former CEO of
Hollinger International, and three former executives of the company for siphoning funds from deals by the
company through non-compete payments. See Tim Arango, Black Given Prison Term Over Fraud, N.Y. TiMEs,
Dec. 11, 2007, at Cl. I have made the facts more clearly a criminal violation to facilitate the Sentencing Guide-
lines analysis.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(a) (2000).
58. See id. sentencing tbl.
59. Id. § 2F1.I(b)(4)(C).
60. See id. sentencing tbl.
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* Base Offense Level: 7 (assuming the violation occurred after the adoption of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's increase in the maximum punishment for mail
fraud and securities violations).
* Loss Enhancement: 18 (based on a $6 million loss, or alternatively the defend-
ants' gain from the fraudulent scheme).
* Sophisticated Means: 2.
* Public Company Officer: 4.6
Using an Offense Level of 31, the sentencing range provided in the Guidelines'
Sentencing Table is 108 to 135 months.6 2 In addition, there are two other enhance-
ments added by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that could come into play in a corporate
crime case such as this. First, if there are more than 250 victims, which could
include the shareholders of BCC, then a six-level enhancement can be added.63
Second, a four-level enhancement can be applied if the crime threatened the finan-
cial security of a public company or 100 individuals, which could happen in a case
involving the diversion of assets and filing of false financial statements.64 If the
Offense Level was 35, then the sentencing range would be 168 to 210 months,
65
while an Offense Level of 37 triggers a 210 to 262 month sentence.66 Should both
enhancements be applied, which could occur in a future Enron or WorldCom sce-
nario, then the sentencing range would stretch from 300 months to life
imprisonment.
The effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on sentencing in corporate crime cases
under the Sentencing Guidelines is clear. The sentencing range for fraud offenses
since 2001 has at least doubled, and depending on whether the court applies addi-
tional enhancements now available for substantial economic crimes, the defendant
could face anywhere from twenty years to life in prison. These sentencing ranges
are similar to what defendants receive for promoting sexual activity with minors
under section 2G1.3,67 or trafficking in narcotics under section 2D1.1.68 Can it be
that a CEO engaged in accounting fraud or diversion of corporate assets should be
punished the same as a person distributing a half-kilo of heroin or seeking to entice
a minor over the internet?
61, Id. § 2BI.l.
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL sentencing tbl. (2007).
63. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C).
64. Id. § 2B1.I(b)(13)(B).
65. Id. § 5A.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2G1.3.
68. Id. § 2D1.1.
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IV. RESTORING DISCRETION IN SENTENCING AFTER BOOKER
Newton's third law of physical motion is that for every action there is an equal and
opposite reaction.69 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was an effort to rein in some of the
more aggressive practices in American business by strengthening the roles of vari-
ous gatekeepers-directors, accountants, and lawyers-and requiring corporations
to adopt much more stringent internal monitoring to ensure there would be no
more meltdowns like Enron and WorldCom. ° Any requirement that companies
institute greater internal controls entails significant costs, and there has been a
strong push to roll back certain parts of the Act because of the purported negative
effects on the capital markets in the United States.7'
The criticism has not been limited to the corporate governance provisions, with
questions being raised about whether corporations and their officers should be
prosecuted for what some term as business decisions." The message behind the
new criminal laws and increased sentences for corporate fraud in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was that corporate chieftains, once viewed perhaps as immune to crimi-
nal prosecution, should be the focal point of investigations and prosecutions.7"
Punishments akin to what drug dealers and child pornographers can receive be-
cause a distinct possibility for corporate executives. Whether a CEO should be
viewed as posing the same threat to society as a drug dealer is an open question.
While not strictly Newtonian in response, the Supreme Court's recent sentencing
jurisprudence creates the possibility of an opposing reaction to the increased pun-
ishments that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorized that may effectively change the
white collar crime sentencing atmospherics once again. The Sentencing Guidelines
deprived federal judges of most of the unfettered discretion they exercised until
1987 in sentencing defendants by requiring courts to apply a prescribed set of rules
to calculate a score that was then plugged into a grid to produce a narrow range for
a prison sentence.74 While not completely mechanical, it was a system that treated
the judges more as tellers or scriveners and less like dispensers of just punishments.
69. Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, in THE AGE OF REASON 108 (Louise L.
Snyder ed., 1955).
70. Lynn Stephens & Robert G. Schwartz, The Chilling Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley: Myth or Reality?, CPA J.,
June 2006, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/printversion/cpaj/2006/606/pl4.htm.
71. Sarah Johnson, Sarbox Rollback Report Due November 30, CFO.coM, Nov. 22, 2006, http://www.cfo.
com/printable/article.cfm/8313658/c-2984368?f=options. See generally COMM. ON CAP. MKTS. REG., THE COM-
PETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET (Dec. 4, 2007).
72. See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1431, 1487 (2006) ("As concerns about the costs and effectiveness of criminal liability and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 increase, public demand may build for alternative accountability mechanisms." (citation
omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Ann Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the Prospect of a Hang-
ing: The Criminalization of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 125, 131 (2004) (commenting on how
Sarbanes-Oxley laws are designed to provide prosecutors with the tools to prosecute those who would defraud
investors).
74. See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of Defen-
dant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW &
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In 2000, the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey' started a trend
toward restoring a measure of the discretion judges should have in sentencing when
a jury makes a limited decision on the defendant's guilt without detailed findings to
guide a court on what factors should go into the punishment.76 When the Court
held that the Guidelines were no longer mandatory in United States v. Booker," the
question simply became whether federal district judges would have real discretion
in sentencing, or whether the Guidelines still would be the dominant motif for
apportioning punishment.
In Gall v. United States,7" the Court made it clear that trial judges have the ulti-
mate control over sentencing, subject to limited appellate review.79 While the
Guidelines "should be the starting point and the initial benchmark" in a sentencing
decision, the judge "must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented."" Unlike the more mechanical Guidelines process, federal judges now
should "consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a
unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify,
the crime and the punishment to ensue.""' Gall could not be clearer that the mech-
anistic force of the Guidelines are to be tempered, and perhaps even dissipated, by
the discretion of federal judges who can choose to follow-or ignore-them so
long as the decision is reasonably well explained. 2 After Gall, appellate courts are
to apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, an approach that affords trial judges
wide latitude to decide on appropriate sentences. s
The upward trend in sentencing since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may abate, and
indeed perhaps even may be reversed due to the influence that Gall may have on
district courts. The recent sentencing of three former executives of Hollinger Inter-
national illustrates how lower sentences may become the norm in corporate fraud
cases.8 ' Lord Conrad Black, Hollinger's former CEO, and three others, Peter Atkin-
son, Jack Boultbee, and Mark Kipnis, were convicted in July 2007 for their roles in
diverting from the company funds related to the sale of assets under the guise of
Soc'y REV. 789 (1997) (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines were developed to remove judicial discretion in
sentencing).
75. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
76. Id. at 497.
77. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
78. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
79. Id. at 596-97.
80. Id. at 597.
81. Id. at 598 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
82. Id. at 596-97.
83. Id. at 597. In explaining how the focus is on the sentence and not just the Guidelines, the Court stated,
"[i]f the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a
presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a
presumption of unreasonableness." Id. (citations omitted).
84. See Leonard N. Fleming & Abdon M. Pallasch, 6 1/2 Years, No Remorse; British Lord Headed to Prison
for Fraud After Lecture from Judge, CI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at 6.
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non-compete agreements." The recommended Guidelines sentences for Atkinson,
Boultbee, and Kipnis ranged from about three to almost five years, even using the
more favorable 2000 version of the Guidelines, based on a $6.1 million loss.86 But
the sentencing occurred the very day the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Gall, restoring significant discretion to district judges. 7 Rather than apply the
Guidelines' sentences, the court sentenced the defendants to twenty-four months
(Atkinson),"8 twenty-seven months (Boultbee),89 and probation (Kipnis).9" Only
Lord Black, the CEO, received a sentence within the recommended Guidelines
range at six and one-half years.9 Prior to Gall, I would have expected the judge to
adhere fairly closely to the Guidelines, and if a below-Guidelines sentence were
imposed, then I suspect the prosecutors would have appealed, particularly the grant
of probation. Now, it is unlikely that the government will take the time to appeal
these sentences because the chances of success are almost nil in light of the abuse of
discretion standard. These sentences indicate that federal judges can be expected to
use their discretion in sentencing, which in many cases will result in lower
sentences.
V. CONCLUSION
Gall may well be a harbinger of significant changes in the sentencing atmospherics
in corporate crime cases." The new criminal provisions adopted in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act will remain, but they are largely meaningless given the broad array of
statutes that can be used to reach corporate misconduct. The Guidelines are now
truly advisory, and over time I suspect they will have less sway over federal judges,
who will use their new-found discretion to individualize sentences. That process of
focusing on the individual likely means sentences in white collar crime cases will
on the whole be lower in the future. White collar defendants are almost by nature
the type of appealing person who can sway a judge to be a bit more forgiving.
These defendants are, quite often, just like the judge in terms of social status, back-
ground, and interests. Moreover, they can often muster a large number of support-
ing letters to attest to their prior good works and upstanding community
reputation.93 These defendants are rarely recidivists, and pose virtually no threat to
85. Id.
86. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2FI.1(b)(1)(O) (2000) (recommending an increase of
fourteen levels for a loss of more than $5,000,000).
87. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586; see also Fleming & Pallasch, supra note 84, at 6.
88. Fleming & Pallasch, supra note 84, at 6.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
93. David Louis Raybin, Letters of Support in Criminal Sentencing Hearings, TENN. B.J., July 2006, at 30.
VOL. 3 NO. 2 2008
THE CHANGING ATMOSPHERICS OF CORPORATE CRIME SENTENCING
the safety of the community 94 -most would welcome them as neighbors and mem-
bers of the local community. So is this the beginning of the end of the pervasive
influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on sentencing in corporate criminal cases?
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94. See Carl Emigholz, Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White-Collar Drug Crime Sentencing Disparity:
Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583, 610 (2006) (commenting on how white
collar offenders are ordinarily good citizens in the community).
